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Abstract
Synaesthesia is a condition that gives rise to usual secondary sensations (e.g., colours are
perceived when listening to music). These unusual sensations tend to be reported as being
stable throughout adulthood (Simner & Logie, 2007) and the consistency of these experiences
over  time  is  taken  as  the  behavioural  hallmark  of  genuineness.  Our  study looked  at  the
influence  of  mood  states  on  synaesthetic  colours  in  synaesthesia.  In  Experiment  1  we
recruited  grapheme-colour  synaesthetes  (who  experience  colours  from  letters/digits)  and
elicited  their  synaesthetic  colours,  as  well  as  their  mood  and  depression  states,  in  two
different testing sessions. In each session, participants completed the PANAS-X (Watson &
Clark,  1999) and the BDI-II  (Beck,  Steer,  & Brown, 1996),  and chose their  synaesthetic
colours  for  letters  A-Z from an  interactive  colour  palette.  We found that  negative  mood
significantly decreased the luminance of synaesthetic colours. In Experiment 2 we showed
that  synaesthetic  colours  were  also  less  luminant  for  synaesthetes  with  anxiety disorder,
versus those without. Additional evidence suggests that colour saturation, too, may inversely
correlate with depressive symptoms. These results show that fluctuations in mood within both
a normal and clinical range influence synaesthetic colours over time. This has implications
for our understanding about the longitudinal stability of synaesthetic experiences.
Introduction
Synaesthesia is an inherited condition that causes unusual secondary sensations. For
example,  synaesthetes may see colours when smelling odours (Day, 2013), or they might
experience tastes when hearing words (Ward & Simner, 2003) or listening to musical notes
(Beeli,  Esslen  &  Jäncke,  2005).  These  experiences  feel  intrinsically  normal  to  the
synaesthete,  who  will  have  experienced  them  since  childhood  (at  least  in  the  case  of
developmental synaesthesia, the focus of the current article). Synaesthesia is found in at least
4%  of  the  population  (Simner  et  al.  2006),  and  two  recent  genome-wide  studies  have
identified genetic regions of interest on chromosomes 2, 5, 6, and 12 and 16 (Asher et al.,
2009; Tomson et al., 2011). Synaesthesia is a multi-phenotypic condition depending on which
modalities are merged (e.g., sound with colour, taste with shape etc.), but one of the most
common  forms  is  grapheme-colour  synaesthesia (Simner  et  al.,  2006)  in  which  colour-
experiences  are  triggered  by  reading,  hearing  or  thinking  about  graphemes  (letters  or
numbers). In scientific parlance (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) graphemes would be the
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“inducer” stimulus in this variant, and colour would be the “concurrent”, and we shall use
this  terminology  throughout  our  paper.  In  this  article  we  will  look  at  how  synaesthetic
concurrents of colour can be influenced by the mood states of synaesthetes.
Since  one  person  cannot  access  another’s  perceptual  experiences,  synaesthesia
researchers  rely  on  measuring  the  behaviour  of  synaesthetes,  or  their  neurophysiological
responses,  but  they also elicit  first  person accounts.  When adult  synaesthetes  report  their
concurrent sensations for any given list of inducers, these tend to be highly consistent over
time. In other words, a given inducer (e.g., the letter A) tends to elicit the same synaesthetic
concurrent  (e.g.,  the  colour  red)  for  any  given  synaesthete  in  repeated  testing.  Indeed,
synaesthetic sensations are often thought to be consistent  by definition throughout the adult
lifespan and this consistency-over-time is taken as the behavioural hallmark of synaesthesia
in genuineness testing (see Johnson, Allison, and Baron-Cohen, 2013 for review, and Simner
& Bain, 2013 for how this constancy develops in childhood). In a typical genuineness test of
synaesthesia (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wyke & Binnie, 1987), synaesthetes are required to report
their  synaesthetic  associations  for  a  stimulus  list  (e.g.,  a  list  of  letters),  and  must  be
significantly more consistent in a retest compared to a group of nonsynaesthete controls, who
are asked to invent analogous associations (i.e., to make up colours for the 26 letters and then
recall these later). Hence, synaesthetes tend to be highly consistent and have been shown to
out-perform controls even when tested over far longer time intervals, and even when controls
are given monetary incentives to perform well (e.g., Ward, Simner & Auyeung, 2005). For
example, synaesthete EP was 100% consistent in her colours for a set of words across one
year, compared to a nonsynaesthete control who was just 17% consistent over two weeks
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1987).
Research into synaesthesia has relied heavily upon this consistency feature because it
is the standard by which synaesthetic status is traditionally verified. But although virtually
every  synaesthete  described  in  the  literature  has  been  shown  to  be  significantly  more
consistent  than  controls,  they  are  not  necessarily  100%  consistent.  Grapheme-colour
synaesthetes in a  study by Simner et  al.  (2006) for example,  had consistency scores that
ranged from 73-100%. All were considered synaesthetes because they were each significantly
more consistent than controls. Nonetheless, this variation in consistency shows there can be a
degree of impermanence in  synaesthetic  sensations,  which is  rarely talked about  (but see
Simner, 2012; Cohen Kadosh & Terhune, 2012; Eagleman, 2012). In the current paper we ask
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what might account for variations in reported synaesthetic colours, and we begin by briefly
exploring several theoretical possibilities below.
We first point out that inconsistently reported synaesthetic associations might be due
to difficulties in reporting, rather than to inconsistency in the experience itself. For example,
a synaesthetic colour that lies on the border between the two colour categories of, say, red and
brown (i.e., a maroon-like colour) might be described as red on one occasion but brown on
another, making the association appear inconsistent when it is in fact not. Alternatively, it
might  be  difficult  for  the  synaesthete  to  identify  the  sensation  at  all.  Lexical-gustatory
synaesthete JIW, for example (who experiences floods of taste in the mouth when reading
words)  experiences  tastes  he  cannot  always  identify,  and  this  too  can  lead  to  reporting
discrepancies (e.g., one taste was reported as Sugar Puffs© breakfast cereal on one occasion
but Rice Krispies© breakfast cereal on another -- even though the taste itself had not changed;
Ward & Simner, 2003). Inconsistencies in reporting might also arise when a single inducer
has more than one concurrent: grapheme-colour synaesthete JM, for example, reports that her
letter L is “both black and yellow. Not a mix of those two, it's  just both simultaneously”
(personal  communication).  Again  this  might  artificially  lower  consistency  scores  if  JM
chooses to report yellow on one occasion but black on another. Indeed, some synaesthetic
concurrents are so highly complex that it is almost inevitable for inconsistencies in reporting
to arise. Consider synaesthete MJS for example, who has sequence-personality synaesthesia
(in  which  letters,  numbers  and  other  sequences  are  synaesthetically  imbued  with  human
qualities; Simner, Gärtner & Taylor, 2011). Since personality has many facets, personality
concurrents are necessarily complex, and this can cause misleading reports. MJS for example
first described the number 2 as ‘someone who gets things done’, but later as ‘a quiet type’
(Simner et al., 2011). This appeared inconsistent until she was asked again four years later, at
which point  she described the personality more fully as a  “good quiet  little  sort,  can be
counted on. Deals with it. Ideal employee’ (Simner et al., 2011; pg. 293). Only then was it
clear that the concurrent itself never changed, even though selective reporting had made it
appear inconsistent. Finally, it is also possible that different facets of a concurrent are more
prominent at different times. 
In all instances above, the nature of the synaesthetic concurrent was unchanged over
time but simply reported differently. It is possible, however, that concurrents themselves do
change over time. This issue has been almost entirely overlooked in the literature and is
poorly understood. In this paper we ask how synaesthetic colours might change from day to
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day,  particularly under  the influence of  mood.  Human moods or emotional  states change
across  points  in  time,  and it  is  therefore  reasonable  to  ask  whether  these  mood changes
influence synaesthesia in some way. There are several reasons to believe they might. First,
mood states can affect cognition,  reasoning and attention (Oaksford,  Morris,  Grainger,  &
Williams, 1996; Compton, 2003; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006; Blanchette & Leese, 2011;
Pessoa,  2008)  so  may  indirectly  influence  synaesthesia  simply  because  attention  on  the
inducer,  for example,  is  necessary for synaesthetic colours  to be triggered (for review of
attentional influences on synaesthesia, see Rich & Mattingley, 2013). Alternatively, changes
in mood might influence synaesthetic experiences more directly, and if this is true, it could
cause fairly regular fluctuations in synaesthetic experiences. If mood state does influence
synaesthetic concurrents, we ask what form this influence might take. 
To answer this, let us briefly review what is known about how mood and colour are
related, both in synaesthetes and nonsynaesthetes. In synaesthesia, there have been a small
number of case reports of emotion as the direct inducer for a synaesthetic experience. One
historical  account  describes  case  E,  for  whom “experiences  are  emotionally colored in  a
literal sense” (Cutsforth, 1925; p 529). This descriptive account suggests that E experienced a
range of stimuli (odours, sounds, memories) in terms of the colour of their emotional valence:
pleasant stimuli  were often blues,  reds,  and yellows, while  unpleasant  stimuli  were often
greens and browns. In more detailed account in the modern literature, Ward (2004) described
GW, who reports synaesthetic colours on the presentation of emotionally valent words. When
presented with a list of names for example, she experienced colours more for the names of
people she knew (and therefore had emotional connections with) than of people she did not
know. Common nouns, too, triggered colour according to their emotional value: words that
were  highly emotive  such as  ‘love’ elicited  synaesthetic  colours  more  often  than  neutral
stimuli, such as ‘chair’. There was also an association between emotions and the nature of the
synaesthetic  colour:  positive emotive words had a lighter  and more saturated colour,  and
more negative words were darker and less saturated. Ward (2004) therefore concluded that
GW’s  inducer  had  an  emotional  component  distinct  from lexical  qualities  of  the  words
themselves, and that this linked high luminance and saturation to positive emotional valence. 
Mood  and  emotional  state  are  also  associated  with  colour  qualities  for  even  the
general population. Studies have shown that different colour qualities (i.e., of hue, saturation
and  luminance)  are  linked  to  different  mood  states.  Manav  (2007)  found  that  subjects
associated the colour yellow for example with more negative emotional adjectives when its
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luminance was lower (e.g.,  boring,  anxious,  depressive).  Children too are already able to
express coherent shared emotional responses to colours at the age of 5-6 years. When asked
“How does this colour make you feel?”, they tend to give positive emotions to bright colours
(e.g., pink, blue, red) and more negative emotions to dark or achromatic colours (e.g., brown,
black, grey; Boyatzis and Varghese, 1994). A similar finding has been replicated in the adult
population (Hemphill, 1996). 
One final  set  of studies  suggests again that mood variances may influence colour
associations -- this  time for clinical mood states -- and they can even influence the very
nature of colour perception itself. For example, Bubl, Kern, Ebert, Bach, and Tebartz van Elst
(2010) found that participants with major depression have altered perception of luminance
(see below). Major depression is a common mood disorder which affects approximately 10%
of  the  population  at  any  one  time  (Office  for  National  Statistics,  2000)  and  whose
predominant  symptom is  persistent  low mood (Hammen,  1997) or  a  lack  of  joy (Peters,
Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, & de Vries, 2003). In this sense, major depression might be
considered  an  extreme extension  of  sadness,  and indeed,  both  involve  overlapping  brain
regions (in both instances, negative mood state is associated with decreased activity in right
prefrontal cortex and increased activity in the subgenual cingulate; Mayburg et al., 1999).
Given our interest in mood, it is relevant to consider how depression or other clinical mood
states might also relate to different colour qualities. Bubl et al. (2010) looked at vision in
participants with major depression by assessing their contrast gain. Contrast gain refers to the
ability to differentiate objects from their surroundings based on their luminance contrast; an
example of high contrast, for example, is the appearance of black letters on white paper. Bubl
et al. (2010) evaluated the ophthalmologic response of the retina when healthy or depressed
participants  viewed  stimuli  of  differing  contrasts.  They  found  significantly  lower  retinal
contrast gain in depressed patients, suggesting that when people are depressed, they are less
able to perceive luminance contrasts in the visual world. The same researchers also showed
that people with depression had lower contrast discrimination performance in a behavioural
task (Bubl, Tebartz van Elst, Gondan, Ebert & Greenlee, 2009). Finally, Carruthers, Morris,
Tarrier, and Whorwell (2010) found that people in certain clinical mood states are also drawn
to different types of colours in a systematic way. They asked healthy participants, anxious
participants, and participants with depression to select their colour preferences from a colour
palette. Both depressed and anxious individuals were more drawn to the achromatic end of
the spectrum – particularly to the colour grey. This suggests that low clinical mood states may
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relate not only to changes in luminance detection, but also to lower saturation (i.e., ‘chroma’)
in colour preferences.
The review above has shown that mood states are systematically linked to colour in
three  different  populations:  healthy  individuals,  clinical  population  (with  depression  or
anxiety) and synaesthetes. Healthy individuals associated negative emotional moods with low
saturation and luminance, both as children and adults. Depressed and anxious individuals are
drawn  to  low  saturated  colours,  and  the  former  experience  poor  contrast  sensitivity  to
luminance. Finally, synaesthetes who are specifically triggered by mood states as inducers
experience lower saturated/ luminant colours for negative valence words. 
The current study
Above we reviewed the role of mood/emotion in  synaesthesia  and in  colour  associations
more generally.  In this  study we explore whether  it  can also play a role in variations in
synaesthetic  colours,  even  for  a  type  of  synaesthesia  not  generally  linked  to  emotional
qualities. Grapheme-colour synaesthesia is considered on the whole to be (a) consistent over
time, and (b) devoid of emotional influences (at least in the  triggering of colour; see also
Callejas,  Acosta,  &  Lupiáñez,  2007  and  Hochel  et  al.,  2009  for  a  discussion  of  how
synaesthetes might appraise the un/pleasantness of their synaesthesia, once triggered). Here
we  ask  whether  changes  in  mood  state  can  nonetheless  influence  grapheme-colour
synaesthesia, to bring about subtle changes in synaesthetic concurrent colours over time. In
Experiment  1,  we examine  day-to-day changes  in  mood  in  a  non-clinicial  population  of
synaesthetes. In addition, since transient sadness and major depression recruit similar brain
regions and have similar impact on the association of colour with mood, we will also consider
the  role  of  non-clinical  depressive  traits  (Experiment  1)  and  clinical  anxiety  disorder
(Experiment 2). From our review of colour in clinical/nonclinical mood states above, we
predict that positive mood states may be associated with more luminant/ saturated colours,
while negative mood states may associate with darker/ less saturated colours. Given these
strong predictors for saturation and luminance, we focus on these two features in the current
paper, to the exclusion of hue (but we consider the impact on hue in a subsequent paper, Kay,
Carmichael & Simner, in prep). 
Experiment 1
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In  the  study  below  we  elicited  synaesthetic  colours  for  letters  from  a  group  of
grapheme-colour  synaesthetes.  Each synaesthete  selected  their  colours  from an on-screen
colour  palette,  and  did  so  twice,  separated  by  a  period  of  approximately  three  weeks.
Participants were instructed to enter each session only when in a naturalistically different
mood: positive on one occasion and negative on another. We confirmed their mood levels
using  mood  questionnaires,  and then  compared  their  synaesthetic  colours  across  the  two
states of mood, in terms of changes in saturation and/or luminance. We used questionnaires to
evaluate both non-clinical mood state, and depressive traits. We predicted that the positive
mood state would be associated with higher saturation and luminance in synaesthetic colour,
while the negative mood state would be linked to lower saturation/luminance levels. 
Methodology
Participants:  Participants  were  24  native  English-speaking  grapheme-colour
synaesthetes  who  experience  coloured  letters  (mean  age  45.8  years,  st.  dev  =13.0;  21
females).  Participants were recruited from the Edinburgh-Sussex Database of Synaesthete
Participants,  and had previously been verified as genuine cases using the ‘gold standard’
measure  of  consistency  over  time  (e.g.,  Baron-Cohen  et  al..  1987).  In  this  previous
verification stage, participants were given synaesthetic triggers as stimuli (in this case, a list
of  26 letters)  and were required to  verbally report  their  synaesthetic  colours.  They were
retested without warning after approximately two months, and their mean consistency score
was 91.7% (st. dev = 12.6). This performance was significantly higher than non-synaesthete
controls (n=40; from Simner et al., 2006) who were only 36.2% consistent (st.dev = 13.8; t=
16.1, df= 62, p<.001). Synaesthete participants were paid £20 for their involvement in our
main study, which was given ethical approval by the local ethics board at the University of
Edinburgh. Since their genuineness was established as part of other studies, this took place
some time before the current study -- in some cases, several years earlier -- and so would not
have  influenced  performance  in  the  current  task  (in  which  synaesthetic  colours  are  also
elicited). 
Materials:  To  remove  geographical  restrictions  on  testing,  our  experiment  was
generated  via  an  online  testing  platform,  created  using  a  survey  builder  website.  The
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experiment had three components: a test of mood (the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
- Expanded form; PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999), a test of depressive traits (the Beck
Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) and a test to elicit synaesthetic colours.
These are described in brief below.
PANAS-X: This mood test requires the participant to read 60 emotive words,
such as ‘distressed’ or ‘enthusiastic’.  Participants were asked to rate  how relevant
each word was to their current mood state on a 5-point scale, ranging from “not at all”
to “extremely”, with one rating per word. For the present study, we focussed on the
PANAS-X positive and negative affect scales. Each scale is made up of 10 emotive
words (e.g., enthusiastic and distressed, for positive and negative affect respectively)1.
Stimuli were presented in an order stipulated by PANAS-X, which ensures that words
are well distributed and not clustered into emotion subgroups. 
BDI-II: The BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) is designed to determine the presence
and level of depressive symptoms. In this test, participants were presented with 21
sets of statements, each set comprising four sentences which are similar but represent
a decline in well-being from the first statement to the last. For example:
- I do not feel sad
- I feel sad much of the time
- I am sad all the time
- I am so sad and unhappy that I can’t stand it
Synaesthetic  letter-colour test:  In  this  sub-test,  participants were presented
with each letter, one at a time in a random order, and were required to select their
synaesthetic  colour  from an  accompanying  electronic  colour  palette.  This  palette
showed colour graduations within a square frame, where hue changes horizontally,
and  saturation  changes  vertically.  Participants  can  select  a  colour  by  clicking
anywhere in the frame. Luminance was manipulated by a separate ‘luminance bar’
1 The words within the PANAS-X are also further divided into additional subgroups: four negative 
(fear, hostility, guilt, sadness) three positive (joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness) and four neutral 
(shyness, fatigue, serenity, surprise). However, given the small number of words in each sub-group, 
and our relatively small sample size, we do not consider these subgroupings for the purpose of the 
current study.
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placed vertically to the right of the palette, which could be dragged up and down
using the mouse. The selected colour is displayed in a separate display below the
palette, and encoded numerically to quantify its hue, saturation, and luminance.
Procedure: Participants were informed they would be taking part in an online study
which they were  to  complete  by visiting  our  website  twice  (i.e.,  at  two separate  times).
Participants were asked to log onto the website to take part in Session 1, but in particular,
only when they felt in a specific mood state. Half the participants were asked to take part in
the first session when they felt in a positive mood and the other half when they felt in a
negative mood. This is the first time a mood manipulation of this type has been used when
testing synaesthetes. The participants were informed that the test would take approximately
an hour for each session, and that they were to complete all elements of the test during each
session. This was to ensure we had their colour responses for a given session time-linked to
their mood/depressive responses.
The first page of the survey informed participants of their ethical rights. Participants
then  consented  with  a  check  box  and  provided  their  name,  data  of  birth  and  date  of
completing  the  survey  before  proceeding  to  the  study.  Participants  first  completed  the
PANAS-X, then the BDI-II, then the colour-palette test. The palette was accessed using a link
to an accompanying webpage. Participants selected their colours for letters and transferred
the numeric codes into the main survey screen. After this test was completed, the session
ended. Participants were contacted three days later with the link to the second survey, asking
them  to  be  in  the  alternative  mood  state  when  entering  it.  Therefore,  those  who  had
completed the first survey in a positive mood were asked to be a negative mood, and those
who had completed the first survey in a negative mood were asked to complete the second
survey in a positive mood. The second survey was identical to the first survey. 
Although the participants were not explicitly informed that mood was the factor under
investigation, they were asked to be in a particular mood state to complete each test. During
debriefing, participants reported they found this instruction straight-forward, and we took this
approach to profit from natural variances in mood states (rather than to attempt to vary mood
states artificially within the test itself – see discussion). On average, participants’ two testing
sessions were separated by 23.3 days (st. dev. = 14.0).
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Results
Coding 
Each test was coded prior to data-analysis as follows:
PANAS-X: Responses to each word (e.g.,  distressed) are coded 1 to 5, from “not at
all” and 5 to “extremely”. Our analyses are based on the positive and negative affect scales,
each of which contains 10 words. The score for each scale is calculated as the mean score
across  the  words  in  each list,  giving  a  maximum possible  score  of  5.0 (with  1.0  as  the
minimum). For example, a participant might achieve a total of 32 points by summing each
Likert response across the 10 words in the positive affect scale. Their mean final score for
this scale would therefore be 3.2. 
BDI-II: The BDI-II is scored by first coding each answer according to the level of
response: each level is given a score of 0-3, with 0 being the neutral statement and 3 being
the most negative statement. The final score is generated by adding these sub-scores scores
together to get overall depression score, with a maximum possible score of 63 (with 0 as the
minimum).
Synaesthetic colour-letter test: The participants’ colour choices generated a unique
6-digit alphanumeric code, which represents its hue, saturation and luminance levels. The
values for luminance were averaged across all  26 letters,  for each subject,  and the same
process was also used for saturation data. 
In our analyses below, we first examine whether we successfully manipulated mood
across our two sessions and then examine the influence of mood on synaesthetic colours, first
by luminance and then saturation. Prior to all analyses, we first checked the distribution of
data using a Kolmogov-Smirnov test,  and used parametric and nonparametric analyses as
required.
Analyses
Did We Successfully Manipulate Mood?
We compared mean scores for negative affect and then positive affect across our two
conditions:  Requested  positive  mood  condition vs.  Requested  negative  mood  condition.
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Distribution  curves  show that  negative  but  not  positive  affect  scores  were  non-normally
distributed and so we use a Wilcoxon signed rank test and a paired sample t-test, respectively.
Table 1 shows that, as anticipated, the Requested negative mood condition generated higher
negative affect scores than the Requested Positive mood condition (Z=-3.8; p<.001), as well
as lower  positive affect scores (t=9.4, df=23, p<.001), and higher BDI-II depression scores
(Z=-4.7; p<.001). 
Table 1
Requested Negative mood
Condition
Requested Positive mood
Condition
Mean Negative Affect 2.1 1.3
Mean Positive Affect 2.2 3.3
BDI-II 15.7 5.0
Table 1. Mean scores across testing conditions in Negative/Positive affect (from the PANAS-X
test)  and  in  depressive  traits  (from  the  BDI-II  test).  There  were  two  testing  conditions:
participants were instructed to take part when their mood was either low (Requested negative
mood condition) or high (Requested positive mood condition). BDI-II depression scores are
‘Minimal’ below 14, and ‘Mild’ at 14-19. 
Since scores indicate participants were in the appropriate mood states within each testing
condition,  we assume henceforth that  differences across conditions  in synaesthetic colour
reflect  changes  in  mood.  (We  therefore  also  henceforth  refer  to  our  Requested
positive/negative mood conditions as simply our Positive/Negative mood conditions). 
Does Mood Influence Synaesthetic Colours?
Below  we  examine  the  synaesthetic  colour  chosen  by participants  in  each  mood
condition,  first  by  saturation  data  then  by  luminance  data.  The  mean  saturation  of
synaesthetic colours was 161.6 in the Positive mood condition (st.dev. = 28.1) and 159.6 in
the  Negative  mood  condition  (st.  dev.=  30.1),  showing  no  significant  difference  (t=.46,
df=23, p=.7). However, the mean luminance of synaesthetic colours was 131.5 in the Positive
mood condition (st.dev = 21.4) and 127.4 in the Negative mood condition (st. dev.=20.8; see
Figure 1), and this difference was significant (t=2.4, df=23, p=.0248; see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Mean luminance of synaesthetic  colours from grapheme-colour synaesthetes in
positive versus negative mood. The lower and upper box limits first and third quartiles, and
bars delimiting lowest and highest values.
What element of mood causes changes in synaesthetic colours?
Having  established  that  changes  in  synaesthetes’ moods  affect  their  synaesthetic
colours,  we sought  to  explore  what  elements  of  mood  were  responsible:  positive  affect,
negative affect, or depressive traits. For this we ran a simultaneous entry multiple regression
analysis using all three as predictor variables, with luminance as the outcome variable in one
model, and saturation in another. Our predictor and outcome variables were each calculated
for each subject as the mean across both their testing sessions. We point out that our sample
size is small for regression modelling and so our conclusions here are presented as tentative.
Despite  our  group  effect  above,  there  was  no  significant  model  relating
mood/depression scores as predictors for our luminance data (F= 1.1, df=2, p=.4). However,
for our saturation data, we found a near-significant model (F=2.6, df=2, p=.08). Within this
model, only one predictor approached significance, and this was depression scores from the
BDI-II  (ß=-.60,  t=-1.8,  p=.08)  which  was  negatively  related  to  the  saturation  of  the
synaesthetic  colour.  In  other  words,  as  depressive  tendencies  increase,  the  synaesthesia’s
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saturation tended to decrease.  We illustrate  this  relationship in the scatterplot shown (see
Figure 2) with best-fit line shown.
Figure  2.  Scatterplot  showing  a  near  significant  (p=.08)  inverse  correlation  between the
depressive traits  of grapheme-colour synaesthetes, and the saturation of their  synaesthetic
colours. Depressive traits are scored on the Beck Depression Inventory – II. The graph also
shows the best-fit line and 95% confidence interval surrounding it.
Discussion
Our study has shown that the synaesthetic colour experiences of grapheme-colour
synaesthetes are influenced by their mood. We requested that participants completed our tests
in two different mood states, and confirmed those mood states with mood questionnaires. We
found  that  participants  reported  significantly  less  luminant  synaesthetic  colours  in  the
negative mood state compared with the positive mood state. We also found a suggestion that
the saturation of synaesthetic colours might be influenced by depressive traits: there was a
trend towards lower saturation when depressive traits were higher. In the study below we
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extend this finding to a clinical mood disorder, and we also address a methodological concern
arising from Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
There were a methodological concern arising from Experiment 1, which we aim to
address in a second study here. Our concern is to verify that we did not induce strategic
effects in our first study simply by having asked participants to be in a particular mood. Our
method above had advantages because it allowed relatively naturalistic mood differences, but
it also may have alerted our participants to the nature of our investigation. In the study below,
therefore, we test the effect of mood without drawing attention to this feature. In Experiment
2, we screened a large random sample of the population to identify the synaesthetes among
them,  and  we  also  had  participants  fill  out  a  health  questionnaire.  Embedded  in  the
questionnaire was an option to indicate whether the participant was suffering from anxiety
disorder. Anxiety disorder is a condition in which sufferers experience generalised worry and
anxiety, not (necessarily) connected to recent events. Commonly regarded as belonging to a
spectrum of  mood related  disorders,  symptoms include  feelings  of  threat,  irritability and
tension (Tyrer & Baldwin, 2006). 
Methodology
Participants:  Our  participants  were  34  English-speaking  grapheme-colour
synaesthetes  (mean age = 21.9,  SD = 5.8,  20 females),  six  of  whom had (self-reported)
anxiety disorder (mean age 20.8, S.D. 2.8; 3 females) and the remaining 28 reported did not
(mean age 22.1 years, S.D. 6.3; 17 females). Participants were recruited via a large scale
screening  of  2847  members  of  the  general  population  (mean  age  28.4,  SD= 14.3;  1530
female)  for  grapheme-colour  synaesthesia  (see  Carmichael  et  al.,  in  review,  for  further
information). Our subjects were verified as synaesthetes using the objective test described
below (see Materials and Procedure).
Materials and Procedure: Our procedure allowed us to identify a group of randomly
sampled synaesthetes, tested objectively, and also to verify which of those synaesthetes had
anxiety  disorder  and  which  did  not.  Our  procedure  also  allowed  us  to  determine  our
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synaesthetes’ grapheme-colours, so that we could then compare these across individuals with
and without anxiety disorder.
All 2847 participants (including the 34 synaesthetes that would ultimately be found
among them) were sent to an online testing website where they completed a 2-stage test. The
first stage was a health questionnaire in which participants indicated (inter alia) whether they
did, or did not suffer from anxiety disorder. This health questionnaire listed 24 conditions in
total  (e.g.,  anxiety  disorder,  asthma,  migraine)  meaning  that  our  focus  of  interest  was
sufficiently hidden. 
The second stage of testing was a short  questionnaire  which described grapheme-
colour synaesthesia and asked whether participants thought they might experience this. For
those who responded in the affirmative, an objective test followed. As in Experiment 1, this
objective  test  for  synaesthesia  was  based  on  consistency-over-time  as  the  behavioural
hallmark of synaesthesia.  Also as before,  synaesthetes were identified as those who were
significantly more consistent than nonsynaesthete controls. Our consistency test was this time
performed  via  the  online  diagnostic  site  synesthete.org  (see  Eagleman,  Kagan,  Nelson,
Sagaram & Sarma, 2007 for methods, also Carmichael et al., in review). This site not only
verifies synaesthesia, but also gathers synaesthetic colours in a way that can later be analysed
according to saturation and luminance values. In this battery, graphemes were presented three
times each in a randomised order and participants were required to select their synaesthetic
colour for each grapheme from a palette of 256x256x256 colours (see Eagleman et al, 2007
for  details  of  this  interface).  In  this  battery,  the  mean  colour  distance  across  the  three
presentations of each grapheme is converted to a standardized score, where a score less than 1
represents a distance small enough to indicate synaesthetic status (see Eagleman et al., 2007
for details). All 34 synaesthetes achieved this required score of less than one. 
Results 
In our analyses we compared the grapheme colours of synaesthetes with and without
anxiety disorder. The output of the online testing site was the colours of graphemes encoded
as  RGB  (red,  green,  blue)  vector  values.  We  first  converted  these  values  to  their
corresponding  hue,  saturation  and  luminance.  We  then  averaged  the  luminance  of  all
graphemes for each subject across all their responses (maximally, this was a mean across all
three presentations of each letter a-z and each digit 0-9, although participants were free to
omit graphemes that had no synaesthetic colour). We then repeated this for the saturation
values,  and  finally  compared  both  these  types  of  means  across  participant  groups.  The
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saturation of synaesthetic colours was not significantly different for synaesthetes with anxiety
disorder (mean = 209.4, SD = 12.6) compared to those without (mean = 191.0, SD = 35.9;
t=1.2, df= 32, p=.2). However, synaesthetes with anxiety disorder had significantly darker
(i.e, less luminant) colours (mean = 102.3, SD = 21.5) than those without anxiety disorder
(mean = 121.9, SD = 20.4; t=-2.1, df= 32, p=.04). This effect is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Mean luminance of synaesthetic colours from grapheme-colour synaesthetes with
and without anxiety disorder (shown as Syn + anxiety and Syn – anxiety, respectively). The
lower and upper box limits first and third quartiles, and bars delimiting lowest and highest
values. Outliers are shown as cases marked ‘q’.
Discussion
Our study has shown that the synaesthetic colour experiences of grapheme-colour
synaesthetes are different for those with and without anxiety disorder. Those self-reporting
this condition had significantly darker synaesthetic colours (i.e.,  lower in luminance).  We
discuss the implications of our findings across both studies below.
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General Discussion
In our studies, we elicited synaesthetic colours for letters from groups of grapheme-
colour synaesthetes, using an on-screen colour palette and converting colour selections into
numeric values for hue, saturation, and luminance. In Experiment 1, synaesthetes selected
their colours twice, separated by a period of several weeks, and were instructed to enter each
session in a naturalistically different mood: positive on one occasion and negative on another.
In each session we confirmed their mood state using the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999)
and the BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) which quantify both nonclinical mood states
and  also  depressive  traits.  Our  questionnaire  data  confirmed  that  participants  were  in  a
significantly more positive mood when this had been requested of them. We then compared
our participants’ synaesthetic colours across the two (positive vs. negative) mood states in
terms of  changes  in  saturation and luminance.  We found that  synaesthetic  colours  in  the
negative mood state were on average significantly less luminant than in the positive mood
state. A second, more speculative multiple regression analysis looked at which features of
mood might influence colour changes: positive affect, negative affect (PANAS-X subscales
thereof), and depressive traits (from the BDI-II scale). This analysis suggested that saturation
might also be influenced by depressive traits:  there was a trend towards lower saturation
when depressive  traits  were  higher.  However,  given that  this  latter  trend  failed  to  reach
significance at the conventional alpha level, we will not consider it further here. 
In Experiment 2 we extended this finding with another group of grapheme-colour
synaesthetes. We showed that mood can alter synaesthetic colours not only when it fluctuates
in non-clinical everyday life (Experiment 1), but also with it  alters more dramatically,  in
anxiety disorder  (Experiment  2).  We showed that  synaesthetes  with  self-reported  anxiety
disorder experience significantly darker synaesthetic colours compared to synaesthetes not
suffering  from anxiety  disorder.  Second,  we  addressed  a  methodological  limitation  from
Experiment 1, where our request for participants to take part in a given mood state may have
alerted them to the aims of our study. In Experiment 2, the aims of our study were sufficiently
hidden by asking about mood (i.e., anxiety disorder) among 23 other medical conditions. In
evaluating  our  findings,  we  first  point  out  that  the  colour-changes  that  arose  with
mood/anxiety were not large: hence our synaesthetes were still highly consistent over time,
and significantly more consistent than controls. Similarly in Experiment 1, colours for letters
were overall still very similar across the two testing sessions: their mean luminance changed
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by only 2 percentage points (i.e., 4.0/255) and their mean saturation by only 0.8 percentage
points (i.e.,  2.0/255).  Hence although synaesthetic colours are influenced by mood states,
they  shift  only  marginally  when  mood  varies  within  a  normal  (i.e.,  non-clinical  range).
Nonetheless, these differences were larger in Experiment 2, where the mood manipulation
was more extreme: the colours of synaesthetes reporting anxiety disorder were more than 7
percentage  points  (19.6/255)  darker  in  luminance.  In  both  experiments,  these  differences
were systematic and statistically significant, but the more extreme mood change caused the
more extreme difference in synaesthetic colour. 
We point out that our findings fit with prior literature relating mood to colour in both
the general nonsynaesthetic population, and in clinical nonsynaesthetic populations. We saw
above  that  healthy  adults  and  children  associate  negative  emotional  moods  with  low
saturation and luminance (Boyatzis & Varghese, 1994; Hemphill, 1996; Manav, 2007) and
that depressed and anxious individuals are drawn to low saturated colours (Carruthers et al.,
2010). Our own findings reflect the same direction of effects in  synaesthetic colours. Our
findings also fit with one previous study showing that an emotionally-mediated synaesthete
experienced darker and less saturated colours from negatively valent words (Ward, 2004). In
all cases therefore, negative mood states were linked with low luminance and/or saturation of
colours.  If we assume that our findings reflect similar mood changes in grapheme-colour
synaesthesia, what might be at the root of these changes? One possibility is that mood may be
influencing  synaesthetic  colours  via  arousal.  Another  possibility  is  that  changes  in
synaesthetic colour by mood are mediated by attention. It is known that attention broadens in
positive  mood  states  (Compton,  2003;  Wadlinger  & Isaacowitz,  2006)  so  may indirectly
influence synaesthesia simply because attention on the inducer is in some way heightened.
Rich  & Mattingley  (2013)  provide  a  comprehensive  review of  how attention  influences
synaesthetic colours, and one intriguing fact from our own data may speak to this issue: the
PANAS has a subscale of attention (comprising the items  Alert;  Attentive;  Concentrating;
Determined).  A  post-hoc  correlation  between  luminance  and  attention  reveals  a  near
significant r value (r=-0.22, p=0.06). This seems to suggest that one aspect of mood linked to
changes in synaesthetic colour may indeed be attentiveness2. Nonetheless, this result is just a
trend based only on four  items,  and so we leave  it  to  future  studies  to  explore  the  link
between attention and synaesthetic colour variation in more detail.
2 We did not conduct further analyses of PANAS subscales because we had no other a priori 
assumptions, and therefore chose to avoid the corrections required by multiple comparisons, given 
also our small sample size. 
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We might also consider our findings in terms of the neurological bases for mood, and
also for synaesthesia.  Mood and emotional processing has been localised to a number of
regions,  most  particularly  the  limbic  system,  including  the  hippocampus,  septal  nuclei,
amygdala,  cingulate gyrus,  mammillary bodies and hypothalamus (for review see Martin,
2006). The amygdala has been particularly implicated in processing the emotional importance
of stimuli,  for example,  in behavioural and cognitive response to stimuli that induce fear
(Davis, 1992; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995). However, the amygdala is also
believed to be important for perception and attention (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Williams,
McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2005). For example, Young, Scannell, Burns and Blakemore
(1994)  found that  the  amygdala  has  connections  to  numerous  cortical  regions,  including
sensory regions. It is possible therefore that differences in emotional processing induced by
mood changes have direct influences on visual, and other perceptual functions. Alternatively,
we might consider instead one area in particular in visual cortex, V4, which has been directly
implicated in synaesthetic colours (e.g., Hubbard et al., 2005), but has also been linked to the
feature of contrast gain (Gardner et al., 2005). We saw above that contrast gain is altered in
depressive mood states (Bubl et al., 2009; 2010). It may be possible, therefore, that the same
mood-linked processes that alter contrast gain may have simultaneous effects on synaesthetic
colour-selective regions in the brains of synaesthetes. 
Following  the  completion  of  our  own  study,  a  related  article  has  very  recently
appeared in  press  which is  strongly compatible  with our  own (Dael,  Sierro,  & Mohr,  in
press).  These  authors,  like  us,  have  questioned  the  role  of  mood,  emotion  and  affect  in
synaesthesia. Their article is an interesting opinion piece hypothesising that emotion might
hold sway in synaesthesia  not  only as an inducer  or concurrent,  but  also as  “neither  the
inducer nor the direct concurrent, but a moderator or mediator of the synesthetic coupling”
(Dael et al., in press). We suggest that our own study now offers precisely the data to support
this speculation. Our results show empirically that mood can indeed mediate the synaesthetic
experience,  and  we  point  the  reader  to  Dael  et  al.  (in  press)  for  an  excellent  and
comprehensive  review  of  mood  and  emotion  in  both  synaesthetic  and  non-synaesthetic
perception.
In evaluating our study we would like to present two possible alternative explanations
of our findings, and evaluate these alternatives in light of the data at hand. One key finding to
consider when interpreting our study is  that prior research has shown mood changes can
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influence  perception  itself  (e.g.,  Bubl  et  al.,  2009;  2010).  Given  this,  an  alternative
interpretation  of  our  data  might  be  that  people  with  synaesthesia  in  fact  have  rigidly
consistent synaesthetic colours, but that mood changes alter their ability to  indicate those
colours via our task. In other words, it may be that their interface with our colour wheel was
compromised by changes  in  real-world perception,  but  their  synaesthesia  itself  remained
unchanged. A closer  inspection of the direction of our data  appears to  speak against  this
possibility, and we explain this below. 
Bubl et al.  (2009; 2010) found that individuals with depression had lower contrast
sensitivity, and although it is difficult to interpret this directly in terms of absolute luminance
perception,  it  may be that  this  represents a  shift  towards under-perceiving lightness (i.e.,
perceiving lightness as being less light). This would certainly follow from decision studies
linking  negative  mood  states  with  lower  luminance  (e.g.,  Boyatzis  &  Varghese,  1994;
Hemphill,  1996;  Manav,  2007;  see  above).  Furthermore,  depressed individuals  do indeed
explicitly  report  that  light  appears  dimmer  (Friberg  &  Borrero,  2000),  and  perceptual
judgements of brightness are lessened following negative (vs.  positive) affect judgements
(Meier, Robinson, Crawford & Ahlvers, 2007). If we extend this conclusion to the current
study, we might then wish to ask whether our findings could simply be explained as our
participants  perceiving our  screen colours  as  less bright  when in a  bad mood.  If  so,  our
findings would be unrelated to changes in synaesthesia at all. However, the direction of our
findings argues against this, because we in fact found the opposite effect: selected colours
were lower in luminance, but should have been higher if the screen simply appeared darker in
a perceptual sense.  In other words,  if  perception rendered the screen perceptually darker,
subjects should have selected higher (not lower) levels of luminance in order to compensate.
They did  not:  luminance  fell  in  the  negative  mood  state  suggesting  this  represented  an
accurate selection of an altered internal colour, rather than an impaired real-world selection of
an unchanged internal colour.  
A second alternative interpretation of our findings is that our mood caused changes
not  in synaesthetic colour,  but in  participants’ positioning of the curser on our electronic
palette.  An  anonymous  reviewer  has  pointed  out  that  luminance  in  both  studies  was
manipulated vertically with lightness at the top. This leaves open the possibility that poor
mood state did not affect luminance, but that instead it affected the height selected on the
screen (via English spatial  metaphors related to mood such as:  "I  feel down today").  We
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investigated this possibility and found it was not the case. From the same n=2847 sample we
examined the data of all subjects who attempted our test for synaesthesia but were ultimately
not synaesthetes. Remembering that synaesthetes are those with a standardized score in our
objective  consistency  test  of  <1  (see  Methods),  we  now  selected  as  a  group  of  non-
synaesthete controls all those who scored >2. By coincidence, this group had the same make-
up as our synaesthetes (n=34, of whom six had anxiety disorder). These controls completed
the identical task as synaesthetes, under exactly the same testing conditions, with exactly the
same instructions, and all were recruited by exactly the same method. If anxiety/ negative
mood state causes people to place the cursor lower on our electronic palette we would expect
again to find that those with anxiety disorder selected colours with a lower luminance. They
do not: people both with and without anxiety disorder placed the cursor at the same height
(i.e., they choose the same luminance) as each other. The mean luminance for those with and
without anxiety disorder was 110.2 [SD= 24.0] and 107.3 [SD= 12.8] respectively (t =0.27,
df=5.51, p=0.8). Hence only for those with synaesthesia, does anxiety disorder lead to lower
luminant (synaesthetic) colours.
In  conclusion,  we  have  found  that  mood  states  influence  concurrent  colours  in
grapheme-colour synaesthesia, and that negative states in particular give rise to colours that
are  lower  in  luminance,  either  as  part  of  everyday  non-clinical  fluctuations  in  mood
(Experiment 1), or as part of more extreme fluctuations of the type found in anxiety disorder
(Experiment 2). We also found a trend to suggest that higher depressive traits within the non-
clinical  range  may  give  rise  to  lower  saturated  synaesthetic  colours.  These  results  have
implications for research into synaesthesia not only because they provide novel information
about how mood alters internal perceptions, but because they challenge the traditionally held
view that adult synaesthetic colours are consistent over time. We invite future researchers to
explore further when and how synaesthetic colours might vary over time, as a key to better
understanding the limits of this unusual condition. 
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